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Peer to Peer Networks for
Defense Against Internet Worms
Srinivas Shakkottai , R. Srikant
Abstract— Internet worms, which spread in computer net-
works without human mediation, pose a severe threat to com-
puter systems today. The rate of propagation of worms has been
measured to be extremely high and they can infect a large fraction
of their potential hosts in a short time. We study two different
methods of patch dissemination to combat the spread of worms.
We first show that using a fixed number of patch servers performs
woefully inadequately against Internet worms. We then show that
by exploiting the exponential data dissemination capability of
P2P systems, the spread of worms can be halted very effectively.
We compare the two methods by using fluid models to compute
two quantities of interest: the time taken to effectively combat
the progress of the worm and the maximum number of infected
hosts. We validate our models using Internet measurements and
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of malicious mobile code has lead to a paradigm
shift in Internet security applications. Earlier, computer viruses
were inherently limited by the fact that human mediation
was required for them to propagate, which also meant that
human intervention was sufficient to contain them. However,
with increased connectivity of computers and availability of
information regarding vulnerabilities of operating systems and
applications, there have been several instances of malicious
code that propagate on their own. Such mobile malicious code
are now called worms. Interest in worms has been fueled
by headline-making attacks causing near cessation of Internet
services, and the names of these worms – such as Code-Red,
Slammer and Blaster– are now known to most Internet users.
Measurement studies indicate that worm propagation usu-
ally follows the classical sigmoid curve as illustrated in
Figure 1. The figure, which is obtained from [1], shows the
propagation of the Code-Red (v2) worm measured over the
duration of 24 hours. There is an exponential growth stage
followed by a slow finish stage. The worm was programmed
to switch from an ‘infection phase’ to an ‘attack phase’, and
begin an attack on certain websites at a preselected time. Such
behavior is by no means unique to Code-Red. The same kind
of infect-then-attack behavior was observed with the Blaster
worm [2] as well. The Witty worm deleted small sections of
the hard-disk contents on the infected hosts and its effects on
the system were noticeable only over time [3]. The Slammer
worm was the most benign to the infected host – all it did
was to spread [4]. However, it caused storms of packets that
overloaded networks as it spread.
Worms seen so far have not significantly injured their
hosts during the time that they spread, since killing their
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Fig. 1. Graph from [1] based on Internet measurement data, illustrating the
nature of propagation of the Code-Red (v2) worm.
host would prevent them from spreading effectively. A host
might actually be unaware that it is infected, as none of its
functions are impaired. This fact means that one can deal with
worm infestations by patching. Hosts that are susceptible to
the worm as well as those already infected could download
and install a patch, which has the dual role of eliminating the
malicious code from the host and closing the hole that enabled
the infection in the first place. Typically patches are issued
by either the creator of the OS or by a dedicated anti-virus
provider. However, given the alarming rate at which worms can
propagate (the Slammer worm infected more than 90 percent
of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes [4]), there has been a
need to rethink strategies for handling worm attacks. By and
large, research has focused on three areas – monitoring of
worms, cutting down the rate of propagation (throttling) and
delivering patches.
In our model we have a network of susceptible hosts that
subscribe to the services of a patch provider. This assumption
is made on the basis of the fact that major OS creators
automatically provide subscription to their patching services.
We assume that the number of infected hosts when the patch
is released is small as compared to the total number of
hosts, which is in accord with the fact that so far most
attacks have happened after a vulnerably has been disclosed.
Also, worms which exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities
(zero-day worms) have not been common [5]. Once the patch
is released, the provider sends an update message (which is
tiny as compared to the patch) to all hosts which proceed to
try and download the patch.
When designing a system for the containment of worms, the
2main question which comes to mind is that of how long one
has before the worm goes into ‘attack phase’. If this time is
sufficiently large, one could hope to patch a large fraction of
computers before the attack occurs. Considering the fact that
worms have a stage in which their growth rate is exponential,
even if the worm is slowed down, the time taken to infect a
large fraction of hosts is likely to be small. In such a case it
is very possible that a fixed number of patch servers would
be unable to cope with the spread of the worm. It might then
be advisable to combine throttling with a peer-to-peer (P2P)
network that would be used for patch dissemination.
Related Work
While the science of epidemiology or the study of causes,
distribution, and control of disease in populations has been
of interest to mankind for centuries, the past couple of years
have seen an large upsurge of interest in the field. Interest in
the area has stemmed from both computer worm epidemics
as well as the organic kind. There is now an ever increasing
body of literature dealing with the measurement, modeling
and analysis of computer worm propagation and prevention.
We highlight some important contributions in this area.
A good deal of work has gone into measuring the spread
of worms on the Internet [1], [2], [4]. Researchers often try
to reverse engineer the worm to understand its nature and the
signature of its attack process. The actual measurement is done
by means of a network telescope. The idea here is to monitor a
large fraction of the Internet address space [6], [7]. Abnormal
activity would register hits on the monitored space. In [8],
[9], there are ideas on how a P2P network could be used for
monitoring of abnormal behavior.
Using simple fluid models [10], it is possible to study
disease propagation using simple deterministic differential
equations [11], [12]. In the area of computer worms, initial
work [13]–[15] largely focused on showing that the epidemi-
ology model also applies to the spread of computer worms.
Basic study of defense systems is also present in this work.
More recently, advanced models of worms, which include fine
details such as non-uniform scanning rates, as well as ways to
scale down the network for faster simulation that are accurate
for certain worms like Slammer, have also been studied [16],
[17].
Defense against worms, either by passive or active means,
has developed in parallel with the worms themselves. As
models of worm proliferation have matured, using such models
to make predictions on the performance of worm containment
schemes has gained popularity. Some interesting examples of
such work are [5], [18]. However, they concentrate on the
number of infected hosts at infinite time, rather than at the
time at which the attack phase of the worm begins. However,
an they do not consider the case when infected hosts can
be patched. As observed in [19], worms seen thus far have
usually been fairly benign initially to the infected host so as
to spread quickly, which means that the system operations are
not significantly compromised.
Worm activity in an infected computer can be inferred by
the fact that they tend try to set up new connections at a high
rate. This behavior immediately suggests a way of slowing
down the spread of worms. By slowing down the rate at which
new connections are established, worm applications can be
retarded. This is the principle behind virus throttling [20], [21].
Thus, throttling a virus buys time in which a patch may be
disseminated in the network.
P2P networks have been showing ever increasing popularity
as a means of data dissemination. Internet users are now quite
familiar with the concept and are well aware of software like
KaZaa and BitTorrent which implement the idea. Since these
systems usually have a large number of users, fluid models
may be used in understanding their performance. Work on
modeling and analysis of such systems is present in [22]–[24].
The P2P idea for worm containment has been considered
in earlier work. In [25], the authors consider several types of
worm defense mechanisms, including patching with a fixed
number of patch servers and different types of “patching
worms” that duplicate the worm’s behavior to disseminate
patches. Using a graph-theoretic model, they show that the
patching worms would perform better than a fixed number of
patch servers. However, the improvement in performance due
to the patching worms is not quantified using the graph model.
They also consider the epidemic differential equation models
to quantify the number of peak scans in the system. In [5], the
authors conduct an extensive numerical comparison between
the performance of patching worms and content filtering and
conclude that the two methods have comparable effects only
when content filtering covers 89% of the hosts. Along with
the monitoring aspect, [9] also considers the P2P idea for
propagating alerts generated by the peers themselves about
possible worm infestations and perform detailed simulations
on the fraction of hosts that such a system could save. [18]
contains an extensive analytical study of worm propagation
and a cooperative P2P system for patching is considered.
However, the P2P idea is not thoroughly investigated in this
work.
How is our work different?
The object of our study is to obtain a fundamental insight
into the propagation of worms under active defense. We use
the fluid models describing worm scanning and containment
schemes and solve them to obtain closed-form solutions. Once
we have the solutions, our focus is on the orders of magnitude
of parameters (such as worm propagation time, maximum
number of infected hosts, and patching time) in the system.
We express our results in terms of three quantities –
1) The total number of hosts in the system N (a large
number)
2) The virulence of the worm denoted by β (infections
per unit time), which is the maximum rate at which the
worm can spread.
3) The ratio of the maximum rate of patch propagation to
worm’s virulence denoted by γ (dimensionless).
We present our main insights below, starting with a fairly
obvious one that serves as a benchmark, and proceeding to
less intuitive ones:
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a significant fraction of the hosts.
While this result seems intuitively clear from the well-
known exponential phase of worm spreading, it provides a
useful benchmark to compare different patching schemes.
Essentially, it says that any action that is taken to contain
worms would have to be done within a logarithmic time
frame, since a smart worm would switch to the attack
phase at this time.
For example, for a worm like Code-Red with a suscep-
tible population of about 360, 000 hosts, and β = 1.8
infections per hour [14], the value of 1
β
lnN is about 7
hours. So if a patching scheme does not patch most of
the hosts in 7 hours, it is practically useless at dealing
with it.
• With a fixed number of patch servers, both the
maximum number of infected hosts and the time taken
to disinfect the system are Θ(N).
We show that in the case of a fixed number of patch
servers, the time at which the infection starts to decay is
Θ(lnN) and that the number of infected hosts is Θ(N)
at this time. So a fixed number of patch servers has
practically no effect on the spread of the worm until most
of the hosts are infected. We also show that the time taken
to wipe out the infection is Θ(N), so it takes a very long
time for the system to be free of worms. γ plays almost
no role in the results.
In the Code-Red like worm example, if we rely on a fixed
number of patch servers, even if γ = 300, in roughly 7
hours we have an infected population of 200, 000. It takes
about 25 hours to rid the system of the worm.
• In P2P system, Θ(N
1
γ ) is the maximum number
of infected hosts and Θ(lnN) is the time taken to
disinfect the system.
We show that using P2P patch dissemination, the time
at which the infection starts decreasing is 1
βγ
ln( N
γP
),
the maximum number of infected hosts is Θ(N
1
γ ) (or
Θ(N) if γ ≤ 1), and the time taken for the system to be
worm free is 1
βγ
(
1 + 1
γ
)
ln(N). Thus, the infection hits
its peak and vanishes in Θ(lnN) time. The value of γ
can be increased by throttling the worm. For γ > 1, even
small increases have a profound effect on P2P systems
– for instance, a γ of 2 shows performance of a greatly
superior order than a γ of 300 in the fixed number of
patch servers scheme.
For the Code-Red like worm example, with γ being 2,
the maximum number of infected hosts is of the order
1000 and the infection both hits its peak and is wiped
out in about 5 hours – a paradigm shift from the fixed
number of servers case!
• The number of hosts to be monitored in order to get
reliable measurements is Θ( NlnN )
We show that if we are to obtain information about the
worm’s presence before it spreads to very many of the
hosts (which takes Θ(lnN) time), i.e., if we would like to
know that the worm is in the system by ln lnN time, then
we have to monitor Θ( NlnN ) of the hosts in the system.
We also show that the same order or higher of hosts must
be monitored in order to get a reliable estimate of the
number of infected hosts at any time.
In the Code-Red like worm case, this means that if we
want to know about the presence of the worm in the
time 1/β ln ln(360, 000) = 1.4 hours, we would have
to monitor about 28, 000 susceptible hosts. For a worm
that has the whole of the (IPv4) Internet as its prey, with
232 addresses, this number is about 227 a phenomenally
large number! To monitor such a large number of hosts
one would need either the active participation of network
operators or of the hosts themselves as a P2P system in
identifying anomalous traffic.
Organization of the Paper
We begin the paper in Section II by reviewing a differential
equation model for the uniform scanning worm on the lines of
the classical epidemic model. The model has been solved ear-
lier, and using the solution we show the exponential spreading
of the worm. The models and results in the rest of the paper
are original and form the main contribution. In Section III
we construct an analytical model of the patching process. We
create models for both the fixed number of servers and the P2P
case and solve them. From the solutions we make predictions
on the performance of the systems in dealing with worms.
In Section IV we provide both measured data and simulations
illustrating the characteristics of the patching process. We then
move on to the problem of monitoring the system for worms
in Section V. Finally, we conclude with pointers to extensions
in Section VI.
II. WORM PROPAGATION MODEL
We first review the simple epidemic model to understand
worm propagation. Let the number of hosts in the network
be N . We assume that all hosts are identical in operation and
that until a host has been patched, it is vulnerable to a worm.
Let the number of susceptible hosts at time t be denoted by
S(t). Similarly, let the number of infected hosts at time t be
denoted by I(t). Then we have that at any time t,
S(t) + I(t) = N. (1)
We assume that an infected host scans the address space of
the network uniformly. This assumption follows from the fact
that under our model all hosts are identical, and so are equally
vulnerable to the worm.
The fluid model is constructed as follows. Consider any one
infected host. The probability of its choosing a susceptible host
for infection is S(t)
N
. Let the average time taken for infecting
a susceptible host be 1
α
. Then if the infected host chooses to
scan Q hosts in a unit of time, and there are I(t) infected
hosts performing the same kind of Bernoulli trials, then as
N →∞ the expected number of infected hosts in a unit time
is Qα I(t) S(t)/N .
The factor Qα is the maximum number of susceptible hosts
that an infected host can infect per unit time. We define β ,
Qα, which we call the virulence of the worm. In this paper
we are primarily interested in the order relations of the system
4with N . So we take the unit of time as the expected time
taken for an infection (1/β), which we call infection time
units (ITU). Note that we may convert ITU to actual time by
just multiplying by this factor. Then with time measured in
ITU, the expected number of infected hosts in an ITU is
λ ,
I(t) S(t)
N
, (2)
with λ being the rate of infection .
Now, we assume that the infection process is Markovian,
with time taken for infection to be exponentially distributed
with transition rate equal to λ, then it can be shown [10] that as
N → ∞, the fraction of infected hosts i(t) , I(t)
N
converges
to
i(t) = i(0) +
∫ t
0
(1− i(s)) i(s) ds, (3)
where we have used (1). We represent the above showing
explicit dependence on N (in differential form) as
dI(t)
dt
=
S(t)I(t)
N
, (4)
where it is understood that N is large.
The above is identical to the classical simple epidemic
model [11] and has been used successfully in modeling the
spread of infectious diseases. It has the closed form solution
I(t) =
I(0)et
1− I(0)
N
(1− et)
. (5)
The plot of the above expression looks much like Figure 1 and
it grows exponentially initially and then levels off, yielding the
classic sigmoidal shape.
How long does it take for the worm to spread to a large
number of hosts?
Given that worms so far either follow a spread-then-attack
mode of operation or cause gradual damage, it would be
interesting to know the order of time by which a large number
of hosts are infected. We could possibly expect an attack (or
significant damage) to occur at this time. It also gives a rough
benchmark time at which we can compare the performance of
different patching schemes. We use the following notation that
defines a set of functions Θ(g(N)). We say f(N) ∈ Θ(g(N))
if ∃ c1, c2 and M such that
c1 g(N) ≤ f(N) ≤ c2 g(N) ∀N ≥M (6)
Theorem 1: The time by which significant spread of the
worm occurs is Θ(lnN).
Proof: We would like to know when I(t) = κ N , where
0 < κ < 1. From (5), we directly have
I(0)et = κ N − κI(0) (1− et)
⇒ t = ln κ
1− κ + ln
N − I(0)
I(0)
For fixed κ this time is Θ(lnN).
The above result says that the worm spreads exponentially
fast in any relevant time-frame. We consider an example to
illustrate what this means.
Example
Consider a worm with a virulence of β = 1.5 hosts per
minute and a susceptible population of 85, 000 hosts. It would
take lnN = 11.3 ITU or about 8 minutes to infect a significant
population. The performance of such a worm is comparable to
that of a worm like Slammer [4] that spread to 75, 000 hosts
in 10 minutes. Other worms have much lower rates of spread
due to poor design of the scanning mechanism. 
The result also characterizes the time available for counter-
measures once the worm has appeared. Countermeasures are
useful only if they can do something about the problem in
Θ(lnN) time, otherwise it is a futile activity. We will keep
this in mind while studying patching schemes.
III. PATCH DISSEMINATION
The propagation of worms can be halted by fixing the holes
in the application that allows them to do so. This is the point of
patching. As mentioned in the introduction, in most instances
so far a patch has been developed sufficiently quickly that the
number of infected hosts at the time that the patch is released
is small, so active defense by patching is possible [5]. Hosts
must be informed about the availability of the patch, which we
assume takes a short time since it is a simple update message.
We are then faced with the second task of ensuring that all
hosts obtain the patch. Once patched, a host that was infected
cannot be reinfected by the worm. So the patching process
reduces both the susceptible and the infected population, and
eventually the system is worm free. We then have the following
metrics to characterize any particular method of patching:
• When does the infection hit is peak, and what is the
number of infected hosts at this time?
• How long does it take to end the infection?
We must answer the above questions keeping in mind the
fact that the worm might possibly cause significant damage
at Θ(lnN) time. Our emphasis will be on the order relations
in the system. We will study two possible methods of patch
dissemination:
1) A system with a fixed number of patch servers.
2) A peer-to-peer network.
The system with a fixed number of patch servers models
either a dedicated bank of patch servers or that of a content
distribution network (CDN) with a fixed number of replicas,
while the P2P system models either a patching worm or a
CDN that is implemented in a P2P fashion.
Fixed Number of Patch Servers
Suppose the creator of the patch has a fixed number of patch
servers. Both infected and susceptible hosts try to download
patches from the patch servers. So the question arises whether
a fixed number of servers can contain the spread of the worm.
Let the number of servers be P , which is much smaller than
the total number of hosts present in the network. Let each
server be capable of disseminating γ patches in an ITU. In
other words, the actual maximum rate at which each server
5can disburse patches is γ
β
patches per unit time. Then the rate
at which the servers patches get disseminated is γP patches
per ITU, until the number of hosts to be patched is less that
P . After this point the rate is equal to the number of hosts
remaining times γ. This finishing phase is irrelevant to our
study, since the number of hosts patched during this time
is just P . We now construct the fluid differential equations
corresponding to the system.
Let number of patched hosts at time t be denoted by P (t).
As before, the number of infected and susceptible hosts at
this time are I(t) and S(t) respectively. Also, the rate at which
the worm grows is S(t) I(t)/N . However, patching causes the
number of infectious hosts in the network to decrease. Servers
disburse patches to both infected as well as susceptible hosts.
Then the expected number of infected hosts that obtain the
patch in a unit time is (γ P I(t))/(S(t) + I(t)). In the fluid
model, this quantity is the rate at which the infection decreases.
Similarly, the rate at which susceptible population decreases
is (γ P S(t))/(S(t)+ I(t)). However, since the total number
of hosts in the system is fixed, we can describe the system in
terms of the infected and patched hosts alone as follows:
d P (t)
dt
= γ P (7)
d I(t)
dt
=
S(t) I(t)
N
− γ P I(t)
S(t) + I(t)
(8)
N = S(t) + I(t) + P (t) (9)
The differential equations are valid when number of patched
hosts is no greater than N −P , which is practically till all the
hosts are patched since N >> P . We then have the following
theorem:
Theorem 2: For the fixed number of servers paradigm, we
have that the number of infected hosts
I(t) =
(
N − P − γ P t)(exp(t− P t
N
− γ P t22N
))
exp
(
t− P t
N
− γ P t22N
)
+ C
, (10)
where C = (N − P )/I(0) ∈ Θ(N) and t ∈ [0, N−2P
γP
].
Proof: From (7) by simple integration, with the initial
condition P (0) = P , we have
P (t) = γ P t+ P (11)
So the time at which the number of patched hosts is N −P is
t = 1
γP
(
N − 2P ). Now, consider the infection process. From
(8) and (9) we have
d I(t)
dt
=
(
N − P (t)− I(t)
N
)
I(t)− γ P I(t)
N − P (t)
= −I
2(t)
N
+
(
1− P (t)
N
− γ P
N − P (t)
)
I(t)
Rearranging the above, we have the following second order
Bernoulli differential equation
d I(t)
dt
−
(
1− P (t)
N
− γ P
N − P (t)
)
I(t) = −I
2(t)
N
Substituting V (t) = 1
I(t) yields a first order differential
equation of form
d V (t)
dt
+
(
1− P (t)
N
− γ P
N − P (t)
)
V (t) =
1
N
(12)
The solution to (12) is of the form
V (t) =
1
N
∫
J(t) dt+ C
J(t)
, (13)
where C is a constant and
J(t) = exp
(∫ (
1− P (t)
N
− γ P
N − P (t)
)
dt
)
=
(
N − P − γ P t) exp(t− P t
N
− γ P t
2
2N
)
(14)
Here we have used the expression for P (t) from (11). We now
need to evaluate 1
N
∫
J(t) dt. This is accomplished by simple
integration using the expression for J(t) from (14) as follows:
1
N
∫
J(t) dt =∫ (
1− P
N
− γ P t
N
)
exp
(
t− P t
N
− γ P t
2
2N
)
dt.
Making the substitution q = t− P t
N
− γ P t22N , and integrating
we obtain
1
N
∫
J(t) dt =
∫
eq dq
= exp
(
t− P t
N
− γ P t
2
2N
)
(15)
Thus, (13), (14) and (15) yield the final answer
V (t) =
exp
(
t− P t
N
− γ P t22N
)
+ C(
N − P − γ P t) (exp(t− P t
N
− γ P t22N
)) (16)
Note that C = (N − P )/I(0) ∈ Θ(N), as seen by plugging
in t = 0. Noting that I(t) = 1/V (t), we have the proof.
We see how similar the expression for I(t) looks to (5).
Essentially, the infection progresses unhindered for small t.
We expect that the effect of patching will not be felt till a fairly
large number of hosts is infected. We are now ready to answer
questions regarding its performance. We would first like to
know when the number of infected hosts hits its maximum
value.
Corollary 3: For the fixed number of servers paradigm, the
number of infected hosts is unimodal and starts decreasing
when t = 2 ln
(
N√
γPI(0)
)
∈ Θ(lnN).
Proof: To find out when the number of infected hosts
starts decreasing, we need to find the time when d I
dt
≤ 0. In
order to do this we differentiate (10) and obtain
d I
dt
=
eX
(C + eX)
2
(
−γP (C + eX)+ C
N
(N − P − γPt)2
)
, (17)
6where
X , t− P t
N
− γ P t
2
2N
Setting d I
dt
≤ 0, substituting the value of C, and rearranging,
we get
M(t) ,
N−P
I(0)N
(
N − P − γPt)2
γP
(
N−P
I(0) + e
X
) ≤ 1 (18)
We observe that for t ≥ 2 ln
(
N√
γPI(0)
)
, we have that
M(t) ≤ 1 for large N . Thus, for t ∈ Θ(lnN), the number of
infected hosts starts decreasing.
Recall that in the system without patching, the time taken
for infection of a significant population is Θ(lnN). So, the
effect of patching is felt at exactly this time frame. It also
shows increasing the patching rate γP has little effect unless
it is impractically large (comparable to N ). So even if the patch
servers work very fast as compared to the virus, there would
be no major consequence on the time at which the infection
decreases. We next consider the question of how many hosts
are infected at this time. Because the graph is unimodal, this
is also the time at which the maximum number of hosts is
infected.
Corollary 4: For the fixed number of servers paradigm, the
number of infected hosts is Θ(N) for t ∈ Θ(lnN). This is
also the maximum number of infected hosts over all time.
Proof: Consider (10). For t ∈ Θ(lnN), the number of
infected hosts is Θ(N).
The above result implies that a fixed number of patch servers
is simply unable to cope with the spread of a well designed
worm! In an unpatched system, the worm spreads to Θ(N)
hosts in Θ(lnN) time. Thus, as far as the worm is concerned,
a system with a fixed number of patch servers behaves as if
practically no patching were occurring up to Θ(lnN) time.
A worm which timed its attack at Θ(lnN) time would be
unstoppable. The next question is that of when the infection
actually dies down, i.e., how long will it take for the number
of infected hosts to come down to Θ(1)?
Corollary 5: For the fixed number of servers paradigm, the
time taken for the number of infected hosts to decrease to
Θ(1) is t = N−2P
γP
∈ Θ(N).
Proof: From (11), substituting t = N−2P
γP
, we have that
limN→∞ I(t) = P ∈ Θ(1). Hence the proof.
Thus, the infection is contained well after the attack takes
place. We conclude that patching with a fixed number of
servers is a futile activity. Clearly, we don’t just need a patch
that kills the worm on contact, but also an efficient distribution
mechanism that can deal with the worm by creating new
servers – a P2P system.
Peer-to-Peer Patch Dissemination
We have just seen that the fixed number of patch servers
scheme performs extremely badly in disseminating patches.
We would like to design a system that matches the worm in
its capability to proliferate. The obvious solution is to use
a P2P model. A patch received from a peer would have to
checked with respect to a hash (sent with the update message,
for instance) to ensure security of patches. Such a method of
verification has already been implemented in BitTorrent [26].
In the proposed scheme, hosts use a pull mechanism to obtain
the patch, i.e., they contact hosts at random and ask them if
they have the patch. If the patch is available, it is downloaded,
verified, and installed. This mechanism is at variance with the
push structure of the worm, in which infected hosts contact
hosts at random and try to infect them. However, there is no
real difference in the fluid model.
Construction of the fluid model is similar to what we have
seen before. Let the number of hosts that initially possess the
patch be P , which is much smaller than the total number of
hosts present in the network. Let each host be capable of dis-
seminating a maximum of γ patches in an ITU. Note that γ is
likely to be smaller than the γ that we encountered in the fixed
number of servers case, since the hosts in a P2P system are not
dedicated patch servers. The rate of patch dissemination looks
very similar to the rate of worm dissemination that we saw
in (4) and is given by γ
N
(S(t) + I(t)) P (t). Also, while the
rate at which the worm increases is still 1
N
S(t) I(t), it now
decreases at the rate at which infected hosts are patched, which
is just γ
N
I(t) P (t). Then we have the following description
of the system:
d P (t)
dt
=
γ
N
(S(t) + I(t)) P (t) (19)
d I(t)
dt
=
1
N
S(t) I(t)− γ
N
I(t) P (t) (20)
N = S(t) + I(t) + P (t) (21)
Our problem is now to solve the above system of equations and
answer questions regarding the performance of the scheme.
Theorem 6: For the P2P paradigm, the number of infected
hosts at time t is given by
I(t) =(
1
N2
Peγt
1− P
N
+
1
N
+ Ceγt
(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
) 1
γ
+1
)−1
, (22)
where C = 1/I(0) ∈ Θ(1) for large N.
Proof: The proof technique is similar to the one used
earlier. We first solve for P (t) using (19) and (21) which is
known to have the solution (of the same form as (5))
P (t) =
Peγt
1− P
N
(1− eγt)
(23)
We then use (20) and (21) to obtain
d I(t)
dt
=
(
N − P (t)− I(t)− γ P (t)
N
)
I(t)
= −I
2(t)
N
+
1
N
(N − (1 + γ)P (t)) I(t)
7Rearranging, we have the following second order Bernoulli
differential equation
d I(t)
dt
−
(
1− 1 + γ
N
P (t)
)
I(t) = −I
2(t)
N
.
We convert the above into a first order differential equation
by substituting V (t) = 1
I(t) and obtain
d V (t)
dt
+
(
1− 1 + γ
N
P (t)
)
V (t) =
1
N
(24)
As before, the above equation has a closed form solution
given by
V (t) =
1
N
∫
J(t) dt+ C
J(t)
, (25)
where C is a constant and
J(t) = exp
(∫ (
1− 1 + γ
N
P (t)
)
dt
)
= exp
(
t− 1 + γ
γ
ln
(
1− P
N
(
1− eγt)))
=
et(
1− P
N
(1− eγt)
) 1+γ
γ
=
e−γt(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
) 1+γ
γ
(26)
Here we have used the expression for P (t) from (23). Now,
in order to obtain the closed form solution, we also require
1
N
∫
J(t) dt. So we proceed to integrate the above expression.
We have
1
N
∫
J(t) dt =
1
N
∫
e−γt(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
) 1+γ
γ
dt
We make the substitution q = e−γt and obtain the relation
1
N
∫
J(t) dt =
−1
γN
∫
dq(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
q
) 1+γ
γ
dt
=
1
N
(
1− P
N
) (P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
q
)−1
γ
=
1
N
(
1− P
N
) (P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
)−1
γ
(27)
Then using (25), (26) and (27), and simplifying we obtain
V (t) =
1
N2
Peγt
1− P
N
+
1
N
+ Ceγt
(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
) 1
γ
+1
(28)
Note that C = 1/I(0) ∈ Θ(1) for large N , as seen by
plugging in t = 0. Finally using the fact that I(t) = 1/V (t)
(by definition) we have the proof.
The result shows that as expected, the patch spreads expo-
nentially, directly competing with and destroying the worm.
We can perform a similar analysis as we did in the fixed
number of servers case to determine when the infection starts
decreasing. We have the following result:
Corollary 7: For the P2P paradigm, the number of infected
hosts is unimodal and decreases for t ≥ 1
γ
ln
(
N
γP
)
∈
Θ(lnN).
Proof: As before, the proof is obtained by differentiation.
Note that V (t) = 1
I(t) , hence
d V (t)
dt
=
−1
I2(t)
d I(t)
dt
,
which means that we need to find the time at which V (t)
starts increasing. Differentiating (28), and setting d V (t)
dt
≥ 0,
we obtain
γPeγt
N2
(
1− P
N
) + γ
I(0)
(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
) 1
γ
+1
eγt
− γ
I(0)
(
1
γ
+ 1
)(
1− P
N
)(
P
N
+
(
1− P
N
)
e−γt
) 1
γ
≥ 0 (29)
Since the first term is positive, and P
N
is small compared to
1, a sufficient condition for large N is
eγt
(
P
N
+ e−γt
) 1
γ
+1
−
(
1
γ
+ 1
)(
P
N
+ e−γt
) 1
γ
≥ 0
⇒ t ≥ 1
γ
ln
(
N
γP
)
Note that the first term in (29) is small for t ≤ 2
γ
lnN . So
the condition on t is actually tight for large N . Thus, for
t ≥ 1
γ
ln
(
N
γP
)
, the number of infected hosts is decreasing.
Hence the proof.
The result says that even in the P2P case, it would take
Θ(lnN) time for the infection to start decreasing. It also
says that the time at which the infection starts decreasing is
unaffected by the initial number of infected hosts, unlike the
fixed server case.
The number of infected hosts at this time (which is also the
maximum) ought to be much lower than in the fixed servers
case since far more hosts have been patched in this time. We
show that this is indeed true in the following result:
Corollary 8: For the P2P paradigm, the maximum number
of infected hosts is
Θ(N
1
γ ) for γ > 1
Θ(N) for γ ≤ 1.
Proof: The proof follows directly by substituting t =
1
γ
ln
(
N
γP
)
in (22) and letting N →∞. The maximum number
of infected hosts for γ > 1 is
Imax =
γI(0)N
1
γ
P
1
γ (1 + γ)1+
1
γ
∈ Θ
(
N
1
γ
)
.
For γ ≤ 1, we get from (22) that Imax ∈ Θ(N). Hence the
proof.
The above results shows that even a P2P system has limited
effect in Θ(lnN) time if the patching constant γ ≤ 1. This
8seems intuitively correct – since the virulence β of the worm
has been normalized to 1, only if γ > 1 will we observe
significant reduction in the maximum number of infected
hosts. The final question is that of when the infection is
stamped out, i.e., how long does it take for the number of
infected hosts to become small?
Corollary 9: For the P2P paradigm, the time taken for
the number of infected hosts to decrease to Θ(1) is t =
1
γ
(
1 + 1
γ
)
lnN ∈ Θ(lnN).
Proof: The proof follows directly from substituting t =
1
γ
(
1 + 1
γ
)
lnN in (22) and letting N →∞.
Thus, the time at which the infection to start decreasing
and the time at which it is wiped out are both Θ(lnN). Soon
after the infection hits its peak, it also disappears. If a worm
were to time its attack at Θ(lnN) time, it would only have a
marginal impact on the network.
Discussion
It is interesting to compare the different results we have
with regard to the effect of patching constant γ on the time
at which the infection starts to decrease and the maximum
number of infected hosts.
In Corollary 3, γ appears only within the logarithm. So only
a γ that is comparable with N has any real effect. On the other
hand, in Corollary 7, γ appears both inside and outside the
logarithm. Inside the logarithm, it would have to be quite large
to have any visible effect. However, since it appears outside
and operates on lnN as well, the effect of even γ = 2 is
significant.
Again, in Corollary 4 we noticed that for any γ ∈ Θ(1),
the maximum number of infected hosts was Θ(N). Increasing
γ has no effect unless γ is of Θ(N), which is physically
impossible. On the other hand in Corollary 8, even increasing
γ by a small amount results in order differences in the
maximum number of infected hosts.
So even a small rate of patching by the peers of a P2P
network has far more impact than an enormous rate of a fixed
number of servers. The results illustrate the profound impact
that throttling the worm can have on the system – for a fixed
number of patch servers throttling is of limited value, but
in a P2P system throttling gains are magnified enormously.
Thus, if we use the patch provider’s P servers as seed servers
for distributed patch delivery in a P2P system, we can truly
achieve outstanding performance – we wipe out the infection
exponentially fast!
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We use data measured on the Internet along with simulations
to illustrate the fact that our analytical results, which assumed
large N , can be used to make fairly good predictions on
reasonably large systems, and so mirror reality. We consider a
Code-Red v2 type worm with a virulence β = 1.8 infections
per hour [14] and a susceptible population of 360, 000 hosts
(seen from Figure 1). The spread of this worm was measured
in [1] and we obtained the data used in their study courtesy
of CAIDA (www.caida.org). Our simulations were performed
by using Simulink to simulate the fluid differential equations.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 105
Time in Hours
N
um
be
r o
f I
nf
ec
te
d 
Ho
st
s
Attack Phase
begins here
Fig. 2. Graph illustrating the performance of a fixed number of patch servers.
The solid line is measured Internet data, while the dashed line corresponds
to the fluid model.
We perform our first experiment on the system with a fixed
number of patch servers. This was probably the method used
in handling Code-Red v2, as the rate of patching with time
was seen to be linear [1], [27], with about 15, 000 hosts
being patched in 8 hours. The data obtained from Internet
measurement is plotted as a solid line in Figure 2, while the
dashed line is the simulation. We calculated from the data
that the patching rate γP was roughly 7, 800 per ITU. We
assume that P = 25 (this number is not important since only
γP has an effect on the system) and I(0) = 25. The zero for
time was chosen by matching the exponential growth phase of
the measured data with that of the simulation. Measurement
stopped when the worm went into attack mode and so stopped
random scanning. From Corollary 3 we expect the time at
which the infection hits its peak is t = 2 ln
(
N√
γPI(0)
)
ITU,
i.e., about 7.5 hours, which matches fairly well with the graph.
We also expect from Corollary 4 that the maximum number
of infected hosts would be of order 105, while the graph
shows this value as about 2.3× 105. Finally, we expect from
Corollary 5 that the infection is wiped out in N−2P
γP
ITU,
which is about 25 hours. There is no Internet data on this
number (since measurement stopped during the attack phase),
but the simulation result matches well with this value.
We note that a fluid model to explain the behavior of
Code-Red v2 was studied in [13] and a figure reminiscent of
Figure 2 was presented there. However, the model in [13] uses
an epidemic type patch dissemination, which is not directly
related to the number of patch servers or the ratio of the
patching rate to the worm propagation rate γ. Our model is
explicitly in terms of these physically measurable quantities.
Further, the results in [13] are numerical solutions, while we
obtain closed-form solutions which allow us to analytically
predict the performance of different schemes.
We next perform experiments with the P2P system. Here
we have no Internet data, since such a system has not been
implemented. However, we use simulations to illustrate that
our order results are valid. First we take γ = 1, P = 10
9and I(0) = 25. The results are shown in Figure 3. We
make use of the Corollaries 7, 8 and 9 to find the expected
numerical values. The expected time at which the infection
starts reducing is 5.8 hours, which matches well with the
graph. The number of infected hosts ought to be of the order
105 at this time, and the graph shows a value of 1.1 × 105.
Finally, the infection ought to end in about 14 hours, which
matches quite well with the simulation (the tail is difficult to
see in the figure as the peak is quite high). Notice that even
with γ = 1 the P2P system takes about half the time to wipe
out the infection as the fixed server scheme.
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Fig. 3. Graph illustrating the performance of a P2P system with γ = 1.
Our next experiment on the P2P system is to take γ = 2,
P = 10 and I(0) = 25. We wish to illustrate the effect
of increasing γ to 2. The results appear in Figure 4. The
time at which we expect the infection to start decaying is
2.7 hours, which is approximately what we see in the graph.
The number of hosts infected at this time should be of order
103, which compares with 1.8× 103 that we see in the graph.
Notice that both the time at which decay begins as well as the
maximum number of infected hosts has shrunk sharply. The
effect becomes more and more pronounced as γ is increased.
Finally, we expect that the infection is over in 5.3 hours, which
is what we see in the graph.
The simulations backup our analytical results indicating the
strength of P2P patching – much lower number of infections
and a much lower time in which the infection is contained.
V. HOW MANY HOSTS HAVE TO BE MONITORED?
So far we have studied the rate of propagation of worms
and tried to understand the performance of possible patch-
ing schemes. We now consider a related problem which a
network operator would be interested in – the number of
hosts that require monitoring in order to obtain knowledge
of the existence of the worm. Monitoring in this fashion
yields data on the distribution of infected hosts and efficacy
of patching, for instance the data presented in Figures 1 and
2. Thus, monitoring provides information on questions like
when the infection began, where it originates, how many
hosts are infected at any time and so on. Monitoring is often
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Fig. 4. Graph illustrating the performance of a P2P system with γ = 2.
carried out by passively observing an unused portion of the
Internet address space – a so called “Network Telescope”
[7]. Since the telescope should normally not receive any
packets, scans directed at it often correspond to worm attacks.
Another possibility is for the network operator to passively
monitor a number of real hosts in their address space so as
to obtain information about anomalous behavior. It has also
been suggested that a P2P network could be used to identify
anomalous behavior of hosts [8], [9]. In all cases, we are
interested in answering the following questions:
• How many hosts have to be monitored in order to find
one instance of worm presence in the network in a short
time?
• How many hosts have to be monitored in order to find
out how many infected hosts are present at a given time?
To answer the first question, we need to understand the
behavior of the worm just after it comes into its existence. We
have the following result
Theorem 10: A worm spreads exponentially fast initially,
regardless of the patching scheme.
Proof: The proof follows from (5) and Theorems 2, 6
by taking t << N .
We know that the time taken for effects of patching to show
up is Θ(lnN) (Corollaries 3, 7). We would like to find out
about the worm before it spreads to too many hosts. Since the
worm spreads exponentially initially, if we would like to know
about the worm when the number of infected hosts is Θ(lnN),
we have to ensure that the monitors pick up its presence in
Θ(ln lnN) time. The question is that of how many hosts to
monitor to obtain this information.
Suppose that we monitor M hosts. Then the probability
that a particular infected host chooses one of these monitored
hosts is M
N
. The expected number of monitored hosts that are
scanned in an ITU by all infected hosts is given by MI(t)
N
.
So in the fluid model (with the same assumptions as before),
this value is the rate at which monitored systems are scanned.
Then we have
dM(t)
dt
=
MI(t)
N
, (30)
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where M(t) is the total number of scans received by monitored
hosts in the time interval [0, t]. We now have the following
result.
Theorem 11: In order to detect the worm by t ∈
Θ(ln lnN), the number of hosts that have to be monitored
is Θ
(
N
lnN
)
.
Proof: The proof is obtained by straightforward integra-
tion of (30). We have
M(t) =
∫ t
0
MI(s)
N
ds
=
M
N
∫ t
0
I(0)es
1− I(0)
N
(1− es)
ds
=
M
N
N ln
(
1− I(0)
N
(
1− et)) ,
where we have used (5) in the second step and M(0) = 0. We
could equivalently use I(t) = I(0)et as Theorem 10 suggests.
Since we would like M(t) to be of order 1 in order to detect
the worm at some time t, we have from the above that
M =
N
N ln
(
1− I(0)
N
(1− et)
) .
Then if we are to detect the worm in ln lnN time, we need
M =
N
N ln
(
1− I(0)
N
(1− eln lnN )
) ,
which is easily verified to be Θ
(
N
lnN
)
.
The result indicates that as the number of hosts in the system
increases, the number of hosts to be monitored in order to
obtain fast information about the worm is extremely large.
We now consider the second question. Suppose that we want
to know how many hosts are infected at a particular time.
We know from the previous section that the amount of time
required for patching to take effect in the fixed number of patch
server case is Θ(lnN). If we assume that most of the infected
hosts take this long to be patched, then an infected host is
active for approximately this amount of time. Any one infected
host would perform t scans in t time (remember that β has
been normalized to 1). So the number of scans received by the
monitor by a single infected host in Θ(lnN) time (assuming
that the infected host is not patched in the interval) is M
N
lnN .
If we set this number equal to 1, i.e., our monitor receives 1
scan from a particular infected host, we need
M
N
lnN = 1
⇒M = N
lnN
, (31)
which is identical to the previous result. Thus, the thumb
rule of monitoring NlnN hosts would give a good estimate
of the events in the network. However, if a P2P method of
patching were used, since patching occurs exponentially fast,
one would have to monitor events at a finer time scale. If we
assume that the number of infected hosts that were patched
in time Θ(ln lnN) is small (it could be a maximum of
Θ(lnN) which is small), then the state of the system remains
relatively constant in this tiny time interval. Proceeding as
before we get that the number of hosts to be monitored is
now Nln lnN , which is even higher. The implications of the
above results are best illustrated by examples.
Example
Consider the Slammer-like worm example, where the total
number of susceptible hosts is 85, 000 and the virulence
β = 1.5 infections per minute. We saw earlier that a
significant population was compromised in 8 minutes. Also,
ln lnN = 2.42 ITU, which is 1.6 minutes. Thus, if we want
to know about the worm’s presence in 1.6 minutes, we would
have to monitor 85, 000/ ln(85, 000) ≈ 7, 500 hosts, which is
close to 110 th of the population. The number of infected hosts
at this time would be of the order lnN = 11 hosts.
Example
Consider the current Internet, which largely runs IPv4.
There are a total of 232 addresses present in the system. If
we would like to know about the presence of a worm in
ln lnN = 3 ITU, we would have to monitor 232/ ln 232 ≈ 227
addresses – which is larger than a /8 prefix! To understand
the events in a P2P system, we need to monitor practically all
the hosts. 
Our conclusion is that one cannot hope to achieve mon-
itoring of such a large fraction of the Internet without the
active participation of either the network operators or the hosts
themselves. The numbers strongly support the establishment
of a P2P monitoring system, with either the network operators
sharing data on anomalous behavior or by having peers look
out for abnormal activity such as repeated syns from an
arbitrary host, and report it to a central monitor that would
keep records. A system with monitoring based on the lines
suggested in [8], [9] might be the best way to accomplish this
goal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have sought to make a convincing case
for the use of P2P networks for tackling Internet worms. We
first studied the classical epidemic fluid model in order to
understand the time scales of events. Using analysis, measured
data and simulations, we then showed that a fixed number of
patch servers is incapable of handling an epidemic. We also
showed that a P2P system is far better suited to handle worm
outbreaks, both in terms off the maximum number of infected
hosts,as well as the time taken to wipe out the infection.
Finally, we considered the issue of monitoring the network and
showed that the number of monitors required is so large that
one would need cooperation either among network operators
or the hosts in the system to obtain reliable estimates.
We would like to extend our work to include a complete
stochastic analysis of worms so as to place the fluid models
on a sound mathematical foundation. We would also like to
understand the effects of more complex worm models in order
to include second order effects.
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